Paper/Archive/CVE-2026-41583

CVE-2026-41583

ZcashFoundation zebra — ZEBRA: Consensus Divergence in Transparent Sighash Hash-Type Handling

Description · from the CVE record

ZEBRA is a Zcash node written entirely in Rust. Prior to zebrad version 4.3.1 and prior to zebra-script version 5.0.2, after a refactoring, Zebra failed to validate a consensus rule that restricted the possible values of sighash hash types for V5 transactions which were enabled in the NU5 network upgrade. Zebra nodes could thus accept and eventually mine a block that would be considered invalid by zcashd nodes, creating a consensus split between Zebra and zcashd nodes. In a similar vein, for V4 transactions, Zebra mistakenly used the "canonical" hash type when computing the sighash while zcashd (correctly per the spec) uses the raw value, which could also crate a consensus split. This issue has been patched in zebrad version 4.3.1 and zebra-script version 5.0.2.

Affected

ProductAffectedFixed inSource
zebrazebrad < 4.3.1–CNA
zebrazebra-script < 5.0.2–CNA

Scores by source

GitHub_M (CNA)9.3CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:N/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:H/SA:H
NVD9.1CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:H
CISA ADPSSVCExploitation: none · Automatable: yes · Technical impact: total

References

refgithub.com/ZcashFoundation/zebra/security/advisories/GHSA-8m29-fpq5-89jj